Consumers often have to rely on an expert's diagnosis to assess their needs. If the expert is also the seller of services, he may use his informational advantage to induce overconsumption. Empirical evidence suggests that over-consumption is a pervasive phenomenon in experts markets. We prove the existence of equilibrium over-consumption in an otherwise purely competitive model. This market failure results from the freedom of consumers to turn down an expert's recommendation: experts defraud consumers in order to keep them uninformed, as this deters them from seeking a better price elsewhere. Our model also yields predictions on the diagnosis price that are in line with stylized facts, and provides a theory for why risk-neutral consumers would demand extended warranties on durables.
Introduction
Economists often assume that consumers know which goods or services they want. In fact, in many situations consumers have to rely on an expert's advice to assess their needs. Examples include all sorts of repairs (car repairs, plumbing), health care, legal and tax services; firms face the same difficulty when choosing computers and software.
The informational advantage of an expert suggests that he may have an incentive to make false recommendations, especially if he is also the seller of the services. Although empirical research is relatively scarce for obvious reasons, there is evidence giving support to this concern. Emons (1997) cites a Swiss study showing that the average population had 33% more of seven important surgical interventions than physicians and their families.
In the late 1970's the Department of Transportation estimated that 53% of auto repair charges represented unnecessary repairs (see Wolinsky, 1993) . Together with anecdotical evidence, 1 these observations indicate that we need a better understanding of fraud and inefficient over-consumption in experts markets. Is over-consumption associated with a fundamental market failure? Which mechanism(s) may explain its stability, in spite of competition? And what is its impact on market organization and on welfare?
The impact of competition on over-consumption has been particularly debated in health economics. In that literature, 2 the physician's market power over the consumer is a central factor behind the over-consumption phenomenon. The moral hazard arising from the consumer's insurance coverage is believed to exacerbate the problem. However, fraud may well be an important problem even in the absence of insurance and market power. In this paper, we propose a simple model to investigate whether a competitive experts market performs efficiently if consumers are uninsured.
Contrary to the intuition, but in line with the empirical evidence, we find that the market is sometimes inefficient, and that it may involve equilibrium over-consumption.
Our model is sufficiently rich to point out the key driving forces behind the inefficiencies.
The fact that competition may favour inefficient over-consumption may seem paradoxical. The following reasoning shows how this can happen, by relating fraud and over-consumption. The key problem on experts markets is that the consumer knows there is a loss, but only an expert can determine which treatment is needed.
3 Once the diagnosis is made, the expert thus enjoys an informational advantage over the consumer.
Moreover, there typically exist some economies of scope between diagnosis and treatment, 4 making it costly for the consumer to get a second opinion. It is important to understand that these characteristics of experts' markets do not create per se an incentive to induce over-consumption. However, once the diagnosis is made, the customer is trapped, and the expert may increase its price without fearing that the customer rejects his offer.
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To avoid such a hold-up problem, consumers often ask for a commitment on prices.
In practice experts commit on a tariff, including prices for different inputs such as spare parts, drugs, or labor. Once the diagnosis is made, the expert provides a bill listing the inputs he claims to have used, and computes the price accordingly. In this system, increasing the repair price now requires to justify the use of additional inputs. Still, this does not create over-consumption. Consider an expert claiming that some inputs are necessary for the repair, though they are in fact unneeded. If the customer cannot observe whether these inputs were actually used or not, then the expert will not have to 3 Once the loss is fixed, evidence in favor of one treatment or another has disappeared. Taken together, these features define a credence good, a term coined by Darby and Karni (1973) .
4 These may derive from several sources. Performing a diagnosis may require to strip down an engine, thus transferring some of the repair costs to the diagnosis stage. Once the diagnosis is obtained, asking a second expert to repair the loss may involve additional transportation costs; in the health care case, changing doctors may represent losing trust capital developed with the first physician. Finally it may be difficult to transmit precise information about a diagnosis to another party. 5 In the literature this hold-up problem is associated with the work of Diamond (1971) , who considers exogeneous switching costs from one seller to another; it may be so severe to make the monopoly price prevail as the unique equilibrium price. use these inputs anyway. Consequently over-consumption does not appear; simply the expert has to lie to the customer in order to increase his revenues.
For over-consumption to appear, the customer must be able to verify whether some of these unnecessary inputs were actually used. In that case, the expert has to incur an additional "fraud cost" when he lies, equal to the cost of unnecessary inputs used in the repair. The trade-off is now clear: lying allows to increase the price, but implies a simultaneous increase in the repair cost. Thus an interesting effect appears, which proves to be at the heart of the topic: avoiding fraud and over-consumption requires to make prices closer (in the limit, if the price does not depend on the type of repair, there is no fraud incentive); in other words, cross-subsidies are needed. However, competition makes these cross-subsidies less sustainable, through the threat of cream-skimming. It may thus well be that competition favors fraud.
In order to test these intuitions, we set up a model with the above key ingredients:
informational advantage for the expert, economies of scope between diagnosis and repair, commitment on prices, verifiability of some inputs by the customer (fraud cost). The model incorporates an optimal visit pattern by the customer among experts, together with Bayesian updating of beliefs when an expert emits a recommendation. There is pure competition, in the sense that we allow for entry and experts are allowed to set any tariff, including a price for the diagnosis. Three different types of equilibria are characterized, depending on the parameters.
When both the fraud cost and the economies of scope are high, we show that there exists an efficient equilibrium in which the loss is fixed by the first visited expert, and this expert is truthful. Each repair price can then be set close enough to marginal cost to deter cream-skimming, without inducing fraud. Otherwise we have two cases. Either the fraud cost is high compared to economies of scope; there then exists an equilibrium without fraud in which the first visited expert is truthful, because the customer rejects his offer to get the loss fixed by another expert.
6 Nevertheless this equilibrium is inefficient because the diagnosis cost is sometimes incurred twice.
Finally, when the fraud cost is small relative to the economies of scope, all equilibria must involve fraud and over-consumption. Intuitively this makes sense: fraud can only appear when the consumer is trapped and poorly controls the expert. Fraud means that the expert always claims that a costly repair is needed. The consumer does not learn anything, and therefore accepts to pay a high repair price, despite knowing that with some probability a cheap repair is actually performed. Our theory thus relates fraud and over-consumption to information transmission and cream-skimming: the expert pools information in order to deter the consumer from seeking a better price elsewhere.
Let us now turn to some welfare analysis. Recall that the fraud cost plays two roles. First, it measures the ability of the customer to control what the expert does.
On the other hand, it represents the social cost of over-consumption. These two effects clearly have opposite effects on welfare. Indeed our results show that for low values of the fraud cost the equilibrium with fraud is nearly efficient. Increasing the fraud cost then reduces welfare because fraud still happens with certainty, while the social cost of over-consumption is increased. At the other extreme, when the fraud cost is high enough, equilibrium is efficient. This shows that welfare is non-monotonic in the fraud cost. Caution may therefore be called for when estimating the welfare effects of fraud. Furthermore, we find that even when fraud does not arise in equilibrium, serious inefficiencies may occur; specialization equilibria involving costly double advice are actually worse than equilibria with costly fraud from a welfare perspective. This suggests that the welfare effects of eradicating fraud are not necessarily positive.
Our model is inspired by that of Wolinsky (1993) . This is a simple framework in which the loss may require either a minor or a major intervention. We essentially introduce two innovations. First, we endogenize all the elements of a tariff, including the diagnosis price. 7 The predictions for the diagnosis price are well in line with casual observations. In some markets, such as car or house repairs, diagnoses are often free, whereas in others, such as health care and dentistry, the diagnosis price is significant. In our model, a higher fraud cost implies that intervention prices are closer to costs, which in turn enables the expert to set a higher diagnosis price. Now it seems quite reasonable to assume that the fraud cost is larger in the health care industry than for car or house repairs, since in the former industry the consumer typically observes much more of the inputs used. Our model therefore predicts exactly the pattern described above.
The second innovation is the fraud cost. Previous papers have looked at two extreme cases. First, some have assumed that fraud is costless (Pitchik and Schotter, 1987 , Wolinsky, 1993 , Taylor, 1995 , and Dulleck and Kerschbamer, 2001 . Then, equilibria involving lies are not inefficient. In Wolinsky's model, the only source of inefficiency is the cost of getting a second opinion. In our model, the fraud cost is a parameter associated to the fact that the customer may verify the use of some inputs, and it simultaneously has a welfare impact. This innovation allows us to properly define overconsumption, and to confirm its empirical relevance since it appears as an equilibrium phenomenon.
We allow for the fraud cost parameter to take any value. However, inefficiencies appear only when there is some cost saving for the expert involved in falsely claiming that a major intervention was performed, compared to actually performing it. If there are no such savings, the consumer has full control-it is as if the repair were verifiable.
This confirms the results obtained by a second group of papers, where repair is verifiable (Dulleck and Kerschbamer, 2001 , Emons, 1997 ; they find no fraudulent consumption inducement in equilibrium.
The health economics literature on over-consumption typically features a monopolistic competition setup. No strategic interaction occurs between physicians. Each physician selects both price and quantity of treatment, taken the reservation utility of the consumer (defined by other physicians' prices and quantities) as given. The over- Kerschbamer (2001) assume that the diagnosis price is exogenous. In Taylor (1995) , one of the intervention prices is exogenous.
consumption that results is reminiscent of the price discrimination literature, where a monopolist induces consumers to consume off (and to the right of) their demand curves in order to extract consumer surplus; see Farley (1986) . Some papers have subsequently incorporated asymmetric information between the physician and the patient; this enables the physician to affect the consumer's preferences. In Dranove (1988) , increased competition leads the physician to set a lower price; this in turn causes the patient to accept more easily a treatment offer, so that fraud occurs more often. Our argument is that more competition favors fraud because cross-subsidies become less sustainable.
In the next section we present the setup. We then characterize pure-strategy equilibria, before turning to a welfare analysis. Before concluding, we devote a section to extensions and discussions of various issues.
The Model
Our model features two classes of risk-neutral agents: consumers and experts. There is a continuum with mass one of consumers. Each consumer incurs a loss, which must be repaired. 8 The loss should be interpreted as a symptom: the car does not work properly, the house roof leaks, or a tooth aches. For each consumer a minor intervention is sufficient to get the loss fixed (state m) with probability µ ∈ (0, 1); otherwise, a major intervention is necessary (state M ). The consumer cannot distinguish between the two states; only experts can.
An expert observes the consumer's state at a diagnosis cost d ≥ 0. 9 The marginal cost of an intervention is assumed to be constant and equal to c for a minor intervention andc > c for a major one. For further use, we define C as the minimum expected cost of getting the loss fixed by an expert:
(1)
By assumption an expert is needed both at the diagnosis stage and at the repair stage.
Moreover an expert can repair a loss only if he has made the diagnosis himself. 10 This creates some economies of scope between diagnosis and repair which are measured by d.
Note that the model is mathematically equivalent to one where there is only one consumer. For presentational simplicity, we will therefore often refer to the consumer.
An index i will be used to denote an individual expert.
Once the diagnosis is made, the expert recommends an intervention. Since the consumer may not distinguish between the two states, recommendations may be false.
This is the fraud issue we focus on. We disregard other types of fraud, by assuming that whether the loss has been fixed or not is verifiable information; also, there is no moral hazard in the diagnosis itself. Now, an expert usually provides a bill listing the inputs used, and we will assume that here. As a result, if the consumer observes that some of the inputs were effectively used, making a false recommendation is costly. For instance, suppose the roof leaks and the rooftop needs to be replaced (the minor intervention). However, the roofer (falsely) claims that the rafters are damaged and need to be changed as well (the major intervention). The consumer may easily verify ex post whether the rafters were replaced.
This creates a positive fraud cost f for the expert, incurred when he recommends a major treatment when a minor one would have been sufficient. In this example, f is the cost of replacing rafters which were not damaged, and must be added to the cost of the minor 10 This assumption is made for simplicity; as long as there is some cost associated with visiting an expert, the qualitative nature of our results is valid.
11 Emons (1997 Emons ( , 2001 ) assumes that whether the loss has been fixed is not verifiable, which implies that under-repair may occur. For an analysis of possible inefficiencies in the amount of effort provided at the diagnosis stage, see Pesendorfer and Wolinsky (2002) and Emons (2001) . Wolinsky (1993) studies the possibility of diagnosis errors.
intervention.
12 Ceteris paribus, f is larger the more inputs the consumer observes.
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Finally it is typically harder to claim that the intervention was minor when in fact it was major, than the reverse. For instance, how could the roofer justify changing the rafters if he claimed they did not need to be changed? For simplicity, we assume that an expert may only make a false recommendation when the consumer needs a minor intervention.
We avoid the hold-up problem referred to in the introduction by assuming that the tariffs posted by experts are public information, and that an expert can perfectly commit to his tariff. The tariff of expert i comprises a diagnosis price p i , and prices for the minor and the major intervention, p i andp i . We will describe how experts set their tariffs shortly. Once experts have posted their tariffs, each consumer chooses an expert.
Each pair thus matched then plays the following game.
In Stage 1, the consumer pays the diagnosis price p i , and the expert observes the state of nature at cost d; the expert then makes a recommendation r ∈ {m, M } (in state M , it must be that r = M ). In Stage 2, the consumer accepts or refuses the offer. If he refuses, the game ends. Otherwise, the expert fixes the loss and the consumer pays the corresponding price (p i or p i ).
If the consumer refuses an offer, he returns to the market and chooses another expert, and so forth, until the loss is fixed. The consumer's overall strategy, denoted σ, specifies which expert he chooses to visit, depending on the set of available tariffs and the recommendations that he may have received in the past; it also specifies whether to accept or not a recommendation, given the customer's history and the available tariffs.
Although an expert may commit to his tariff, we impose that he may not commit to 12 One may argue that c + f should typically lie below c: this is the case for example if replacing the rafters is less effort-consuming than if they were really damaged, and effort is not observed by the consumer. It could also be higher, if for example the expert has to damage the rafters himself before replacing them. To keep some generality we do not impose any bound on f , and we also allow for f = 0.
13 Alternatively one could justify the introduction of a positive fraud cost by the expected penalty associated with being caught by an external auditor, or by morals considerations.
making an intervention at a loss:
In reality an expert may always use some stratagem to avoid serving a consumer if he wishes to (for instance by pretending that ordering spare parts will be a lengthy process). The restrictions are a reduced form of an additional stage in the game, where the expert would decide whether to fix the loss or not, once the consumer has accepted.
By contrast, an expert is able to commit to a diagnosis price below marginal cost-that may simply be a tool to attract a consumer in the first place. Because consumers may opportunistically visit an expert to collect a negative diagnosis price, we impose:
When an expert decides on a recommendation strategy, he knows the other experts' tariffs; however, we assume that the expert does not observe the history of the consumer.
Let F i ∈ {0, 1} denote the probability that expert i recommends a major treatment to a consumer in state m.
Given the experts' tariffs and recommendation strategies (p i , p i , p i , F i ) i and the consumer's visit pattern and acceptance strategy σ, one can compute the consumer's payoff as the sum of all prices paid to the experts he visits (only the diagnosis price if he turns down the expert's recommendation, but both the diagnosis price and the intervention price if he accepted the recommendation). This allows to compute an expected payoff, given the initial beliefs (µ, 1 − µ) and the usual Bayesian updating rule, to be applied whenever a recommendation is made. The payoff of an expert equals his revenues, which are simply the prices paid by consumers who visited him, minus the costs. The expert's expected payoff is computed using the actual distribution of losses 14 We will discuss the effects of relaxing this assumption in Section 4.
among consumers who decide to visit him.
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The following definition of a market equilibrium is chosen for its strong degree of competition; we model the idea of free entry by assuming that besides some incumbent experts (denoted i), there is one potential entrant. A Free-Entry Equilibrium
i) The consumer's strategy, σ, is a best response to the incumbent experts' strategies
ii) For each incumbent expert i, F i is a best response to the consumer's strategy σ,
iii) Each incumbent expert i makes non-negative expected profits.
iv) Profitable entry is impossible: there exists no entrant's strategy (p, p, p, F ) and no consumer strategy σ such that
, σ is an optimal strategy given F , and F is an optimal choice of the entrant given σ .
iv.b) and the entrant's profits are strictly positive.
Our definition of equilibrium involves the usual best response conditions i) and ii), for given tariffs. Condition iii) only requires that experts make non-negative expected profits. Competition on tariffs is introduced through the no-entry requirement iv). In order to strengthen competition, we model entry as a hit-and-run process: incumbent experts are not allowed to react to entry, while the customer optimally adapts his strategy to the new situation. 16 For the same reason, the definition allows the entrant to select a consumer strategy among the best responses of the consumer, thus breaking the ties in favour of the entrant.
On the whole this definition incorporates three elements which we think are relevant.
Experts commit to tariffs: this allows to avoid the hold-up problem mentioned in the introduction. At equilibrium the fraud strategies and the consumer strategy form a system of best responses. Finally competition is reinforced by the hit-and-run process assumed for entry.
As a first result, note that at equilibrium each incumbent expert must make zero expected profits. Indeed suppose that an incumbent earns positive profits. Then the entrant could propose the same tariff; because the entrant has the privilege to choose a best response of the customer, he may simply ask the customer to visit him instead of visiting the incumbent. Let us finally mention that we shall focus on equilibria in which each expert equilibrium strategy is played by several experts, so as to stay in line with the competitive paradigm. This is without loss of generality because of the zero-profit result. The zero-profit result also allows for the presence of incumbent experts which are inactive at equilibrium, but may play a role to deter entry. We shall discuss this point later.
3 Results
Efficient Equilibria
Here we derive sufficient and necessary conditions for efficient equilibria to exist. Recall that efficiency obtains when i) the consumer's loss is fixed by the first expert visited, so as to avoid the duplication of diagnosis costs; ii) this first expert is truthful, so that the fraud cost is not incurred and over-consumption does not occur. 
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Turning now to the case where the consumer is initially uninformed about his state, we can readily conclude to efficiency when there are no economies of scope between diagnosis and repair (d = 0). Uninformed consumers could first visit a "diagnosis provider"
offering the tariff (0, +∞, +∞). Since the repair offers would anyway be rejected by the customer, the diagnosis provider is indifferent between both recommendations and could as well tell the truth. The consumer thus obtains information at no cost, and we are back to the preceding case.
Things become more complex with economies of scope (d > 0). It is easily understood that a diagnosis provider cannot play any role in equilibrium. His offer is indeed dominated by that of a "minor specialist," who would propose to make the diagnosis at marginal cost and to fix only small losses, with a tariff (d, c, +∞). Such an offer is consistent with the expert being truthful, since the consumer would reject the offer of a major treatment. Also, compared to the diagnosis provider offer it saves the additional diagnosis cost which was incurred when the loss was minor. Such "minor specialists"
play an important role in the analysis that follows.
Let us thus assume that an efficient equilibrium exists: the first visited expert must be truthful, and the consumer must accept both recommendations. For obvious reasons let us call such an expert a generalist, and for simplicity let's assume that all incumbents offer the same tariff (p, p, p). When the loss is minor, the expert thus chooses between recommending a minor intervention, for a profit p − c, and a major intervention, which
18 Note that marginal cost pricing whereby all incumbents offer the tariff (d, c, c) is not always an equilibrium. Indeed, if the economies of scope are sufficiently large and the fraud cost is sufficiently small, such a tariff would give rise to fraud, despite the consumer being fully aware of his state: if d > c − c, a consumer in state m would accept recommendation M , and this would be profitable for the expert if f < c − c. by a generalist; since he also has to charge for the diagnosis, the attempt is successful only if the diagnosis cost is not too large. More specifically, the entrant may make a profit by offering a minor specialist tariff (d + ε, c, +∞), where ε > 0, unless the following condition is satisfied:
Together with (6), this implies:
In the appendix, we check that this is the only relevant entry, so that the necessary condition (8) also is sufficient. Relatedly, note that multiple equilibrium tariffs may exist, all of which are payoffequivalent from an ex ante viewpoint. The equilibrium tariff is uniquely defined only if
constraints (2), (3) and (4). It also verifies (5), so that the expert may be truthful, and it yields zero expected profits if the consumer visits this expert at the first visit and accepts both recommendations, since
When f > f * the tariff just mentioned is always an equilibrium tariff, and it is the one closest to the marginal cost pricing tariff (d, c, c).
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Hence, when f < c − c, at any efficient equilibrium customers with minor losses subsidize customers with major losses. As the proof of Proposition 1 indicates, this is because cream-skimming aiming at attracting customers with minor losses is the main threat to efficiency.
Inefficient Equilibria: Specialization or Fraud
We now know that all equilibria are inefficient when f + d < c − c, because of the threat of cream-skimming by a minor specialist. It is therefore natural to investigate whether the equilibrium outcome may be that of "full specialization:" the customer first visits a minor specialist with a tariff (d, c, +∞), and if his loss is major he then visits an expert fixing only major losses, with a tariff (d, c, c).
Proposition 2 There exists a free-entry equilibrium involving specialization, such that the consumer visits two experts when he needs a major intervention, if and only if f < f *
Proof: As with efficient equilibria, the true state is revealed to the consumer on the equilibrium path; the entrant may thus seek to attract consumers with the initial beliefs µ, or with the beliefsμ = 0 orμ = 1. Clearly, the entrant would not be able to profit from attracting the latter two, since he would have to charge at least d plus the marginal cost of the relevant intervention, whereas the consumer pays that or less with the proposed equilibrium tariffs (he pays c when he has beliefsμ = 1 and exactly d + c when he has beliefsμ = 1). Thus it only remains to be checked whether the entrant could profitably attract the consumer on his first visit.
Given that some incumbents are minor specialists and that f < f * , a tariff implying truth-telling and consumer acceptance is infeasible. Together with Lemma 1, this implies that the only potentially profitable entrant tariff would be such that the entrant always recommends the major intervention, and the consumer accepts. For such a tariff to be profitable, it must have p + p > C + µf since the fraud cost f is incurred in state m.
Assume that the entrant offers such a tariff (e.g., (p, p, p) 
which is equivalent to
Specialization involves a costly second expert visit for a consumer needing a major intervention. As a result, if the diagnosis cost and the probability of a major intervention are large, the consumer would prefer to get the loss fixed by one single expert, although that would imply over-consumption: the relevant threat to specialization is an entrant who always recommends the major intervention that the consumer accepts. There is therefore a fundamental trade-off between, on the one hand, costly double advice, and on the other hand, costly over-consumption. For this reason, over-consumption appears as an equilibrium phenomenon when the fraud cost is not too large, as will be shown next. For the purposes of the following proposition, we assume that at least one expert offers a minor specialist tariff in equilibrium (this expert is inactive); we will discuss this assumption in detail below.
Proposition 3 There exists a free-entry equilibrium involving fraudulent recommendations and over-consumption, if and only if f < f * and
Proof: Propositions 1 and 3 together with Lemma 1 in the appendix imply that when f < min{f * , f * * }, the only potential market equilibrium is where experts offer tariffs such that each consumer's loss is fixed by the first visited expert, who always recommends the major intervention. Thus, assume that incumbents offer some tariff (p, p, p) such that they agree to make both interventions, p ≥ c, and they make zero expected
. From the proof to Proposition 3, we know that a minor specialist would be able to profitably attract consumers on their first visit if and only if f > f * * . It only remains to be checked whether the entrant could profitably offer a tariff inducing truth-telling and consumer acceptance.
Since f < f * , such a tariff would need to specify some p > c + d to induce truth-telling, which in turn would imply that a consumer visiting the entrant would turn down a mi-nor recommendation to instead visit a minor specialist. Hence, such a tariff is infeasible.
This result shows that even in a purely competitive model, fraud and overconsumption may appear as an equilibrium phenomenon. The reason is that experts would lose the profitable customers if they offered both interventions at reasonable prices and recommended interventions honestly. Fraud is a simple way to avoid consumer defection: the consumer never learns what type of intervention he really needs. But of course, it implies an additional expected cost of µf for the consumer. When this expected cost is too large, another inefficiency arises in the form of specialization, whereby a costly second visit is made in state M . See Figure 1 for a graphical representation.
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[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
Here inactive minor specialist incumbents ensure the existence of equilibria. If there were no such minor specialists, and if incumbents offered a tariff implying fraud and overconsumption, the entrant could offer a tariff inducing truth-telling and acceptance. Even though f < f * , such a tariff would be profitable. The reason is that our equilibrium definition does not allow for a second entrant: there would therefore be no creamskimming even though the entrant's price for the minor intervention would be above c + d, as required for a truthful recommendation.
We think that the assumption of the presence of inactive minor specialists is fairly weak. If a fraction of customers were initially informed that their loss is minor, then active minor specialists would arise endogenously. This variation of the model would not alter our results in any respect. 23 There are in fact many examples of minor interventions that consumers may demand on a regular basis for the sake of maintenance; for cars, such repairs include oil and brake changes.
The fact that an equilibrium may not exist in a game with incomplete information is by itself not surprising. The archetypal example is the Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) insurance model, in which, for some parameter values, pooling candidates are killed by an entry with separating contracts, and candidates with separating contracts are killed by a pooling entry. Here we have an even more complex, cyclical structure: efficient candidates are killed by the entry of a minor specialist, specialization is killed by the entry of a defrauder, and candidates with fraud are killed by the entry of an efficient expert. Interestingly it is because this cycle now counts three stages that an existence result may be obtained by introducing inactive agents.
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To summarize, the three propositions above together with Lemma 1 in the appendix imply that fraud and consumption must arise as equilibrium phenomena for some parameter values:
Corollary 1 If f ≥ f * equilibrium must be efficient. If f < f * and f > f * * , equilibrium must involve full specialization, with costly double advice when the consumer needs a major intervention. Otherwise, it must involve fraud and over-consumption when the consumer needs a minor intervention.
Cross-Subsidies
Except at the borders f * and f * * there exists a multiplicity of equilibrium tariffs. Here we determine the equilibrium prices that are closest to marginal cost. Recall that when f ≥ c−c the marginal cost pricing tariff (d, c, c) is an efficient equilibrium tariff. The following therefore focuses on the case f < c − c. When equilibrium involves specialization, prices that consumers pay may be set at marginal cost (the minor specialists set the price of a major intervention sufficiently high to ensure that the consumer rejects the recommendation). The following proposition, which is implied by previous observations and results, applies to prices when equilibrium involves either efficiency or fraud.
Proposition 4 The major intervention may always be sold at marginal cost: p = c. If the consumer visits one single expert in equilibrium, he pays more than marginal cost for the minor intervention, p > c, and less than marginal cost for the diagnosis, p < d.
Consumers needing a minor intervention subsidize those needing a major intervention.
In any equilibrium where the loss is fixed by the first visited expert, the consumer pays a mark-up for the minor intervention: with efficient equilibria such a mark-up is necessary to induce truth-telling (p = c − f ); with over-consumption equilibria the consumer pays the cost of the major intervention even if the expert performs a minor intervention. The diagnosis price is used to eliminate profits made on minor interventions. This profit turns out to be the same in both types of equilibria: it is equal toc − c − f . As a result, the
is also the same. This is increasing in the fraud cost f . The smaller is the fraud cost f , the larger is the profit made on a minor intervention, and thus the smaller is the diagnosis price. This may explain why car and home repair services typically go together with small diagnosis prices, whereas health care providers in general charge significant amounts for a diagnosis: for repair services consumers observe very few inputs and therefore the fraud cost is small; with health care services, the opposite is true.
Welfare
Since demand is perfectly inelastic, welfare is measured by the expected cost of getting a consumer's loss fixed. Efficient equilibria entail a cost of C, for specialization equilibria the cost is C + (1 − µ)d, and it is C + µf for equilibria with fraud. Here we discuss how welfare is affected first, by changes in the economies of scope parameter d, and second, by changes in the fraud cost parameter f . Figure 1 provides visual aid for the following remarks.
First, it is obvious that for a given number of experts visited in equilibrium, welfare is decreasing in the diagnosis cost d. However, non-trivial changes may occur when switching from one type of equilibrium to another. It is straightforward to verify that welfare increases in a discrete manner when leaving the specialization regime to enter the fraud regime. In the fraud regime, welfare decreases less rapidly with the diagnosis cost, since the consumer then visits only one expert in equilibrium. Welfare again increases in a discrete manner when reaching the efficient regime. Note however that it would be better to have a very small diagnosis cost and specialization, than efficiency together with a larger diagnosis cost. See Figure 2 . In the figure, the values d * and d * * correspond to the threshold values for d, for a given value of the fraud cost f .
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]
For a given diagnosis cost, the maximum welfare is attained for a value of the fraud cost f sufficiently large to enable experts to truthfully reveal the state without inviting cream-skimming. But this maximum welfare may is also obtained if equilibrium involves costless fraudulent recommendations (f = 0). For values in between, equilibrium is inefficient, and welfare decreases in the fraud cost f within the fraud regime. Interestingly, increasing the fraud cost so as to eliminate fraud worsens welfare if it leads to specialization instead.
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE]
Casual observations suggests that fraud in experts markets is generally viewed as a problem. Our model indicates that cautious evaluation is called for: fraud may be an issue from a welfare point of view only if fraud is costly (f > 0). If the fraud cost is nil, equilibrium involving fraud is efficient. Receiving a truthful recommendation is not valuable per se; equilibrium recommendation and visit strategies matter only for the costs that they entail. This feature may convince the reader that models where fraud is not associated with over-consumption may miss important insights.
Extensions and Discussion
Extended Warranties
When buying a durable good, a consumer may usually purchase a warranty that covers repair costs beyond the limits specified by the basic warranty included in the price of the good. According to Lutz and Padmanabhan (1998) , 27% of new car buyers purchase an extended warranty; the proportion is even higher for home electronics products.
These warranties are sometimes offered by the manufacturer, but the market share of independent insurers is significant. Given the administrative costs typically involved in handling insurance claims, there must be some benefit for the consumer to explain the existence of this market. One obvious explanation is risk aversion. However, our analysis offers an alternative explanation, based on efficiency arguments in the presence of risk-neutral consumers.
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The key feature of an extended warranty is that it removes all payments for the consumer at the time of the repair. 27 As a result the cream-skimming threat is completely eliminated, and repairs may be performed in an efficient manner, independently of the parameter values; in equilibrium, with competition among insurers, the price of the warranty would be C. Note that this is true even if the expert performing the repair provides a list detailing the inputs used for the repair and the consumer may observe some of those inputs (i.e., even if f > 0): indeed, since the consumer accepts the repair by definition, the expert has no incentive to induce over-consumption, as that would only increase costs without also increasing revenues.
28 Thus, our analysis suggests that 26 Taylor (1995) makes a similar point in a model where insurance contracts may be a tool to induce the efficient level of maintenance by the consumer.
27 Formally, the model would have to be altered so that the consumer pays the price of the warranty before the loss occurs; the warranty contract would further specify that at the time of the loss, the expert would fix the loss, and the consumer would have to pay nothing more.
28 Clearly this may in turn distort the quality of repair downwards, but that issue is beyond extended warranties may be a "forward" response to a failure of the "spot" market for repairs.
Relatedly, one may wonder what would happen if, in our model, experts could commit to making repairs at a loss. Then experts could always offer a tariff inducing truth-telling and consumer acceptance, simply by setting a unique and low price for both interventions. For instance, consider the tariff (p, p, p) = (C, 0, 0). Since the price is the same for both interventions, and this price is very small, there is no tension between truth-telling and consumer acceptance: the consumer would always accept the minor recommendation, and hence, ex post cream-skimming is no longer an issue. As a result fraud would not arise in equilibrium. However, now ex ante cream-skimming appears as the relevant threat: if d < µ(c − c) the consumer would prefer to first visit a minor specialist, and specialization is then the only possible equilibrium. By contrast, the extended warranty is available for purchase only before a loss arises, and hence also the ex ante cream-skimming threat is eliminated.
Together with the above analysis, this shows that it is the combination of five features that produces equilibrium over-consumption: the informational advantage of the expert, economies of scope between diagnosis and repair, the consumer's freedom to turn down an expert's recommendation, the lack of credible commitment to performing repairs at a loss, and the fact that consumers usually observe some of the inputs used for repair. If any one of these five elements is removed, equilibria with fraud and costly over-consumption disappear.
Durable Goods with a Low Replacement Cost
The above results were derived under the assumption that the loss was fixed with certainty in equilibrium. 
Assume first that r > c; then efficiency requires that a defective good be repaired, even if a major intervention is required (since the diagnosis cost then is sunk). The insights of the above analysis may then be directly applied, with a minor variation:
since r < d + c, if in equilibrium the consumer first visits a minor specialist, he gets the good replaced upon being recommended a major intervention. However, it is easy to verify that all other results remain valid (with some changes in the threshold values).
Things change drastically if r falls below c; then the consumer would turn down any recommendation to get a major intervention (since p ≥ c). As a result, the only potential equilibrium is that of specialization: the consumer first visits a minor specialist, who recommends truthfully; the consumer accepts only a minor intervention. The expected cost for the consumer would then be:
But of course, the consumer would effectively visit the minor specialist only if the replacement cost were sufficiently large to warrant the diagnosis cost:
By contrast to the case where r ≥ c, here the market performs efficiently even if specialization arises, since immediately replacing the good would be inefficient if and only
In this paper, we have argued that the question of fraud on experts' markets cannot be analyzed without reference to the question of over-consumption. Our theory of fraud is based on the strategic content of information: an expert may want to lie to the customer in order to keep him uninformed, thereby preventing the consumer from seeking a better price elsewhere. This argument is general enough to be applied to various industries, such as car repairs or health care, in which information is scarce and each visit to an expert is costly. The model we have solved provides several additional insights.
First, fraud in the form of inefficient over-consumption may arise in equilibrium, even if the market is competitive, and in the absence of insurance. This finding is new in the literature, and it may offer a sound and more structural basis for applied research on physician-induced demand. In particular, the argument given above supports the socalled physician-induced demand hypothesis, which states in a provocative manner that more competition could lead to more over-consumption. In our theory, the consumer's inability to commit to visit only one expert is indeed at the heart of the matter: if consumers could commit, a competitive experts market would perform efficiently, since then cross-subsidies which are necessary to remove incentives to defraud are not threatened by cream-skimming. A credible commitment device exists, however, in the form of extended warranties; this suggests that even risk-neutral consumers may demand such warranties.
Second, the mere threat of fraud may create welfare costs, even in the absence of equilibrium fraud, by requiring the customers to seek a costly double advice. This is what happens in our model under specialization. As we have seen, welfare may be lower in this regime; eradicating equilibrium fraud may thus be a misleading objective. Third, our model explains why diagnosis prices are often set below diagnosis costs.
As in most models with switching costs, by doing so experts want to attract consumers in the first place; but another important rationale is that this allows experts to transfer to customers the profits originating in prices exceeding marginal cost. Our analysis suggests that such mark-ups may be pervasive in experts markets, either as an instrument to deter fraud, or as a direct result of fraud.
Finally, in our framework there is no intrinsic value in obtaining accurate information from the expert. However, such information may matter for third parties; in particular, the performance of insurance markets depends on whether insurance contracts may be contingent on the true state or not. For this reason, and also because insurance obviously is a highly relevant aspect of many experts markets, it would be desirable to extend our model to allow for insurance.
Lemma 1 Assume that f < c − c. Only three classes of tariffs are relevant, both at equilibrium and for the study of entry: efficient tariffs (the expert recommends truthfully, and the consumer accepts), minor specialist tariffs (the expert recommends truthfully, but the consumer accepts only a minor recommendation), fraud tariffs (the expert always recommends a major intervention, and the consumer accepts).
Proof: Consider the game between an expert (either an incumbent or the entrant) and a consumer. There are eight potential pure-strategy equilibria of that game, depending on the expert's recommendation r in state m, whether or not the consumer accepts recommendation m, and whether or not the consumer accepts recommendation M ; we denote by x the consumer's acceptance decision, where y stands for "yes" and n for "no:"
We now show that tariffs leading to equilibria of types 2, 4, 6, 7, and 8 of the game are irrelevant. First, note that the distinction between 5 and 6 is irrelevant; in fact we may always switch from an equilibrium of type 6 to an equilibrium of type 5 by setting p = c. In this case the consumer would indeed accept the recommendation of a minor treatment (x(m) = y), but the expert would always choose to lie (since p − c − f > 0 when f < c − c), i.e., r = M .
Next, we eliminate 2, 4, 7, and 8. Eliminate 4. This corresponds to specialization in the diagnosis; here we show formally that it is weakly dominated from the viewpoint of the expert by specialization in the minor intervention (i.e., case 3). Assume that the consumer visits a diagnosis specialist.
The consumer learns the true state. Let K m denote the consumer's payment for getting the loss fixed upon learning that the state is m, and K M his payment upon learning that the state is M . Clearly, K m ≥ c (since the price of a minor intervention is at least c). Letting ρ denote the consumer's belief that the state is m before the visit to the diagnosis specialist, the smallest consumer's expected payment if he visits the diagnosis specialist is therefore:
since the diagnosis specialist has to charge for the diagnosis. Now consider instead the minor specialist tariff (p, p,p) = (d, K m , +∞) (equilibrium of the game between the consumer and the entrant is then of type 3). Then the consumer is as well off as with the diagnosis specialist, while the expert is always at least as well off.
Eliminate 7 and 8. These two are equivalent, because x(m) is irrelevant when r = M .
Trivially, a tariff leading to this equilibrium of the game between an expert and the consumer, is irrelevant: the consumer learns nothing at a cost d > 0.
Proof of Proposition 1
Reminder: here we assume that f < c − c (when f ≥ c − c the marginal cost pricing tariff (d, c, c) implies efficiency, and this tariff is trivially immune to profitable entry).
In the text we showed that f ≥ f * = c − c − d is a necessary condition for an efficient equilibrium to exist. Here we check that it is also a sufficient condition. That amounts to proving that the only relevant entry is the one mentioned in the text, i.e., where the entrant tries to attract a consumer who has been recommended a minor intervention by a generalist.
Thus, consider some generalist tariff (p, p, p) satisfying constraints (2)- (5), and such that the expected profits are nil: p − d + µ(p − c) + (1 − µ)(p − c) = 0. Recall that the consumer's expected payment is C if he first visits a generalist and accepts both recommendations. We here investigate whether there exists a profitable entry, assuming that all incumbents offer that tariff.
To begin note that on the equilibrium path the consumer has one of the following three beliefsμ that the state is m: initiallyμ = µ; thenμ = 1 if the generalist recommends a minor intervention, andμ = 0 if he recommends a major one. Entry may target consumers with any of those beliefs. Lemma 1 implies that we need only check entries leading to equilibria of types 1, 3, or 5 of the game between the consumer and the entrant. Let (p , p , p ) denote an entrant tariff.
First, we investigate whether there may exist a profitable entrant tariff attracting a consumer with beliefs µ. Clearly, given that the generalist tariff yields zero expected profits, a tariff leading to an equilibrium of type 1 of the continuation game (the expert reveals the truth and the consumer accepts) cannot be profitable. This is also true for an entrant tariff leading to recommendation M with certainty and consumer acceptance (type 5), since the expected payment for the consumer would have to be at least C + µf , which is greater than C. Finally, consider tariffs such that the entrant recommends truthfully and the consumer accepts only recommendation m. For the entrant to make a profit, it must be that p − d + µ(p − c) ≡ ε > 0; there exists some ε > 0 such that this tariff attracts a consumer with beliefs µ if and only if:
The second term on the left-hand side is the consumer's payment if he is recommended M by the entrant and thus has to visit a generalist. But the above inequality is false for any ε > 0 since p +p ≥ c.
Second, we check whether there exists a profitable entrant tariff attracting a consumer with beliefsμ = 0 orμ = 1. Forμ = 0, for the entrant to be profitable, he must offer a tariff such that p + p > d + c. Thus, as long as p < d + c, such an entry is prevented. This is feasible, since this does not conflict with the constraint p ≥ c.
Finally, forμ = 1, the best entrant tariff is such that the entrant reveals m truthfully (otherwise the cost f is incurred); for such a tariff to be profitable, it must be that 
